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Abstract
Discusses the intent behind and the provisions of the Edge Act as well as the application of
the Act to American international banking practices for the past sixty years.
NEW RULES FOR EDGE ACT CORPORATIONS
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL
BANKING ACT OF 1978
INTRODUCTION
The International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA)' generally pro-
vides for federal regulation of foreign banking in the United
States. 2 The Act also addresses the international operations of
United States banks by amending section 25(a) of the Federal Re-
serve Act, known as the Edge Act.3 The effects of the amendments
will be widespread, as establishment of international banking cor-
porations under the Edge Act has recently become one of the most
popular methods for participation in international and interstate
banking by United States banks.4
In addition to amending the Edge Act, Congress directed the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) to re-
vise its regulations concerning the ownership and operations of
Edge Act Corporations in order to further the policy objectives set
1. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as IBA].
2. Through this comprehensive piece of legislation, Congress has attempted,
for the first time, to balance the inequities in the regulatory framework for foreign
banking in this country, which were first brought to light in a 1966 study prepared
by Professor Jack Zwick. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., FOR-
EIGN BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (Economic Policies and Practices, Paper No.
9) (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as Zwick]; notes 57-60 infra and accompa-
nying text. Congress intended that the IBA establish "the principle of parity of treat-
ment between foreign and domestic banks in like circumstances." S. REP. No.
95-1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1421, 1422 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. See notes 64-68 infra and accom-
panying text. See generally Note, The International Banking Act of 1978: Federal
Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United States, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Federal Regulation of Foreign Banks]; 19 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1011 (1978).
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1976). The Edge Act is named after Senator Walter E.
Edge of New Jersey, the Act's principal sponsor. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
See notes 79-102 infra and accompanying text.
4. See Pinsky, Edge Act and Agreement Corporations: Mediums for Interna-
tional Banking, 11 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 25 (Oct., 1978) (Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago); notes 33, 40-45 infra and accompanying text.
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out in the IBA. 5 On June 14, 1979 the Board issued its revised
regulation on international banking operations, updating the ex-
isting rules and combining them into one comprehensive regula-
tion.6
This Note discusses the intent behind and the provisions of
the Edge Act in Part I, as well as the application of the Act to
American international banking practices for the past sixty years.
The amendments to the Edge Act contained in the IBA are exam-
ined in Part II. Finally, the problem of whether the Board's re-
vised regulations will successfully implement the policy objectives
of those amendments is analyzed in Part III.
I. EDGE ACT CORPORATIONS
A. The Edge Act
The Edge Act of 19197 was the last of four congressional at-
tempts to expand the international banking and financial capa-
bilities of United States banks. 8 It was designed "to provide for the
5. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(a). See notes 94-98 infra and accompanying text.
6. Regulation K-International Banking Operations, 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005 (1979)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1980)).
7. Act of Dec. 24, 1919, ch. 18, 41 Stat. 378 (1919) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
611-631 (1976)).
8. Congress authorized national banks to conduct international banking opera-
tions for the first time in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (FRA), Act of Dec. 23,
1913, ch. 6, § 25, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), by
permitting them to establish branches and to receive bankers' acceptances. However,
by 1916 only one United States bank, National City Bank of New York, had opened a
foreign branch. This led to concern that American foreign banking would be monop-
olized by a few powerful banks, causing Congress to amend § 25 of the FRA to per-
mit the establishment of international banking corporations by national banks, which
agreed to follow Board regulations dealing with their activities. Act of Sept. 7, 1916
ch. 461, 39 Stat. 755 (1916) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-604 (1976)). Because this
Act did not provide for federal incorporation, these "agreement corporations" be-
came chartered under state law. The third congressional action further amended
§ 25 of the FRA, permitting national banks to establish international finance cor-
porations. Act of Sept. 17, 1919, ch. 60, 41 Stat. 285 (1919). The purpose of this
amendment, which expired in 1921, was to facilitate long-term borrowing by Europe-
ans through private investment rather than government credit, thereby maintaining
United States export trade. Three months later, Congress passed the Edge Act, Act of
Dec. 24, 1919, ch. 18, 41 Stat. 378 (1919) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1976)),
which combined the objectives of the prior two amendments to § 25 of the FRA.
No significant legislation on American foreign banking has been enacted since 1919.
See generally H. REP. No. 408, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) [hereinafter cited as
EDGE ACT REPORT]; J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, AMERICAN BANKS ABROAD 19-31
(1974); F. LEES, INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE 18-24, 136 (1974);
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financial needs of American foreign trade in a far more comprehen-
sive manner than any preceding legislation." 9
The Act authorized the federal incorporation' of financial in-
stitutions organized "for the purpose of engaging in international or
foreign banking or other international or foreign financial opera-
tions .... ""' An Edge Act Corporation (EAC) is empowered to
provide, on an interstate basis, 12 general banking services for inter-
national customers,' 3 to receive deposits in the United States in
the course of international business,' 4  to establish foreign
branches,' 5 and to invest in the stock of other corporations. 16 This
legislation envisioned two classes of institutions: banking EACs and
investment EACs.1 7 Both are subject to the same regulatory frame-
McGuire, The Edge Act: Its Place in the Evolution of International Banking in the
United States, 3 LAW. AM. 427 (1971); Pinsky, supra note 4, at 25-26; Tamagna &
Willis, United States Banking Organizations Abroad, 42 FED. RES. BULL. 1284
(1956); Wiley, Edge Act Corporations--Catalysts for International Trade and In-
vestment, 16 Bus. LAW. 1014 (1961).
9. McGuire, supra note 8, at 431. See J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8,
at 49-52.
10. A federal charter was considered beneficial:
First, it eliminated the dual regulations imposed on former Agreement cor-
porations which were under the jurisdiction of both the Federal Reserve and
the particular state in which they were incorporated. Second, it was felt by
several legislators that control through agreement is plainly not as satisfac-
tory as control through incorporation under a federal act. Finally, it was gen-
erally understood that the position and prestige of these corporations over-
seas would be greatly enhanced by such association with the U.S. Federal
Government.
J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 51. See EDGE ACT REPORT, supra note 8,
at 2. See also McGuire, supra note 8, at 432.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 611 (1976).
12. No state can exclude EAC entry, by virtue of its federal charter. See note 43
infra and accompanying text. EACs are also excluded from the definition of "bank"
in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 18 41(c) (1976), and are thus
not subject to the interstate banking restrictions of the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1976). See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1976).
14. Id.
15. 12 U.S.C. § 615(b) (1976).
16. 12 U.S.C. § 615(c) (1976). Those corporations, however, must be organized
under the laws of a foreign state, or if organized in the United States, the corpora-
tions may only conduct domestic operations incidental to foreign or international
business. Id.
17. EDGE ACT REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. It is not clear from either the Act or
the House committee print whether Congress intended an exclusive distinction be-
tween banking and investment EACs, although one authority contends that Congress
did not provide for the establishment of separate corporations. J. BAKER & M.
BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 33. The Board's Regulation K, 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1980),
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work, but EACs "engaged in banking"18 are subject to additional
regulations concerning lending limits 19 and reserve requirements
on their domestic deposits.20
In addition to the general limitation that every financial trans-
action performed by EACs be incidental to foreign or international
business, 2 1 the Edge Act contained several other constraints: or-
ganization of an EAC required a minimum capital investment of
two million dollars;2 2 a parent bank could not invest more than ten
first issued in 1920, distinguished the two classes but was also unclear on the re-
quirement of separate incorporation. J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 33.
The Board finalized this distinction in a revision of Regulation K effective in 1957,
21 Fed. Reg. 9,899 (1956), but removed it in a later revision, 28 Fed. Reg. 9,421
(1963). Today the distinction remains one of an operating preference of the owners
rather than a regulatory restriction.
18. "An Edge Corporation is 'engaged in banking' if it is ordinarily engaged in
the business of accepting deposits in the United States from nonaffiliated persons."
12 C.F.R. § 211.2(d) (1980). See notes 165-75 infra and accompanying text.
19. 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(b)(1) (1980). See notes 140-46 infra and accompanying
text.
20. Banking EACs are now subject to Regulations D and Q concerning interest
rate limitations and reserve requirements. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(d) (1980). Prior to the
IBA and the revised regulations, banking EACs were required to carry reserves in an
amount not less than ten percent of their domestic deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1976)
(provision removed by IBA, supra note 1, § 3 (e)).
Nevertheless, the deposit-taking abilities of EACs are very limited. It is clear
that Congress did not intend EACs to be "banks of deposit," which would compete
with domestic banks for funds. EDGE ACT REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. An EAC may
accept in the United States only demand, savings, and time deposits from foreign
governments, persons conducting business principally abroad, and persons residing
abroad. The EAC also may accept any domestic deposits which are incidental to in-
ternational or foreign business. 12 C.F.R. § 2 11.4(e)(1), (2) (1980).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 615(a), (c) (1976). The Edge Act empowers the Board to deter-
mine whether an EAC's activities are incidental to international trade. 12 U.S.C. §
615(a) (1976). The Board is also given authority to approve applications to organize
EACs, 12 U.S.C. § 614 (1976), which has been held to imply the authority to disap-
prove applications. Apfel v. Mellon, 33 F.2d 805 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
525 (1929). In that case, the court found that mandamus would not lie to control the
exercise of the Board's discretion in disapproving articles of incorporation of an
EAC, due to the petitioners' lack of qualifications and experience in the field of for-
eign banking. 33 F.2d at 808.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 618 (1976). This minimum contrasts sharply with the 1916
amendment authorizing the establishment of agreement corporations, for which no
minimum capitalization was required. An apparent shift in congressional thinking
with regard to capital adequacy for international banking corporations occurred be-
tween 1916 and 1919. F. LEES, supra note 8, at 23-24. For an examination of this and
other differences between EACs and agreement corporations, see McGuire, supra
note 8, at 433; Pinsky, supra note 4, at 26. The six agreement corporations currently
conducting an international banking business are subject to the same grants of au-
thority as well as the same limitations as EACs. 12 C.F.R. § 211.1(b) (1980).
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percent of its capital and surplus in EACs;23 and the ownership of
EACs was restricted to United States citizens.2 4
B. Operations of Edge Act Corporations
EACs have been organized since 1919 by American bankers
for many reasons2 5 with varying degrees of success. 26 Early at-
tempts at implementing the Edge Act's provisions indicate that
Congress miscalculated the needs of world trade at that time, 27 re-
sulting in the failure of all of the EACs formed during the 1920's.28
A subsequent inactive period2 9 ended as EACs were revived by
United States banks to complement the growth of international
business in the 1950's.30
23. 12 U.S.C. § 618 (1976).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 614 (1976). This restriction was eliminated by IBA, supra note
1, § 3(c). See notes 79, 82 infra and accompanying text.
25. EACs have assisted parent banks in the conducting of international banking
in the United States, in direct overseas operations, in specialized financing
(including securities underwriting), and in making equity investments. F. LEES, su-
pra note 8, at 148.
26. Compare McGuire, supra note 8, at 437 with 441.
27. See J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 60. See also McGuire, su-
pra note 8, at 437:
The Edge Act did not seem to stimulate the activity that was expected and
desired by its framers. The failure of early Edge Act corporations was not so
much due to inadequacy in the legislation as it was to a changing environ-
ment for international trade. The Act was intended to facilitate foreign trade
by providing ways of extending medium and long-term credit. Federal char-
ters were expected to lend prestige to these institutions. However, the inter-
national trade environment was characterized by a growing economic confu-
sion in Europe, fear of competition by some banks, and lack of American
interest in foreign financing. Passage of the Edge Act was followed by a
world-wide depression. International trade diminished. The deterioration of
foreign economies discouraged American exporters [from selling] abroad un-
less the obligations received were guaranteed by foreign governments. Such
guarantees pre-empted the need for services provided by Edge Act corpora-
tions.
Id.
28. Shortly after the Edge Act was passed, three corporations were organ-
ized under its provisions. Two of them were liquidated in 1925 and the
third was liquidated in 1933. Between passage of the Edge Act and 1929 fif-
teen Agreement corporations were chartered. All fifteen of these corpora-
tions had been liquidated or absorbed by other banks by the early 1930's.
McGuire, supra note 8, at 436.
29. Only two EACs and one agreement corporation were organized between
1932 and 1956. Pinsky, supra note 4, at 28-29. See Bossy, Edge Act and Agreement
Corporations in International Banking and Finance, 46 MONTHLY REV. 88, 89
(1964) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York); McGuire, supra note 8, at 436.
30. See Pinsky, supra note 4, at 29. See generally J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD,
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Since then, EACs have been organized specifically to respond
to changing international economic conditions.31 Initially, EACs
were utilized as holding companies for a parent bank's overseas
branching or foreign investment activities.3 2 More recently, EACs
have provided a means for parent banks to establish domestic in-
terstate networks of international banking facilities.33
American banks were first attracted to EACs for their
"unique" investment powers. 3 4 An EAC may invest in foreign cor-
porations,3 5 while United States banks were generally prohibited
from making such equity investments.3 6 Other advantages of in-
vestment EACs throughout the early 1960's included the ability to
make long-term loans to corporations and foreign governments, and
the ability to invest in foreign banks in countries where the United
States parent banks were prohibited by local law from opening
wholly-owned branches.3 7
Despite statutory amendments in the middle 1960's which re-
moved many of the advantages peculiar to investment EACs,3 8 the
supra note 8, at 65-66. "[W]hile the period 1930-1950 can be characterized as
isolationistic in U.S. international banking, the growth of U.S. international business,
banking, and investment has been phenomenal during the 1950-72 period, especially
during the 1960s." Id. at 65. See also F. LEES, supra note 8, at 142; McGuire, supra
note 8, at 438, 441; Pinsky, supra note 4, at 29. In 1956 there were seven EAC and
agreement corporations in operation. They increased in number to 15 in 1960 and 77
in 1970. See J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 71. By Dec. 31, 1978, 124
such corporations were in existence. Office of Public Information, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. Their total assets grew from $550 million in 1960 to $11.6 billion
in 1976. See J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 71; Pinsky, supra note 4,
at 25.
31. Generally, EACs have assisted American parent banks in following United
States business investment expansion overseas in the 1960's, and they have helped
American banks cope with the growth of foreign banking in the United States in the
1970's as the business investment flow reversed. See J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, su-
pra note 8, at 70, 135; Lees, Foreign Banking in the United States: Growth and
Regulatory Issues, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 463, 463 (1975).
32. Pinsky, supra note 4, at 25.
33. Id.
34. See id., at 27; notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 615(c) (1976). See notes 159-62 infra and accompanying text.
36. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 335 (1976). F. BEUTEL, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF
COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW § 1-40(10) (1979 Cum. Supp.). See generally Hackley,
Our Baffling Banking System (pts. 1-2), 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 771, 608-12 (1966).
37. See Pinsky, supra note 4, at 27-28. As foreign institutions were typically
permitted to make such equity investments, this authority of EACs also helped
United States banks compete with foreign banks on the world market. Id. at 27. See
generally McGuire, supra note 8, at 439-40.
38. In 1966 the FRA was amended to permit national banks to invest in foreign
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use of these corporations did not decline. 39 In fact, EAC activity
increased substantially as United States banks shifted their focus
from overseas expansion to domestic decentralization of interna-
tional banking operations. 40
American institutions initiated this recent domestic expansion
both to meet the needs of corporate customers with expanding in-
ternational operations 4 1 and to offset the growing competition from
foreign bank activity within the United States. 42 While EACs can
be organized on an interstate basis, 43 domestic banks are generally
prohibited from operating a banking business outside their home
state.4 Thus through EACs, American banks have established a
limited presence in several emerging international financial centers
throughout the United States.4 5
banks which are not engaged, directly or indirectly, in any activity in the United
States, except that which is incidental to their international or foreign business. Pub.
L. No. 89-485, § 12(b), 80 Stat. 241 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1976)). The
Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 also eliminated certain advantages of
investment-oriented EACs, as it permits bank holding companies to invest in foreign
corporations. Pub. L. No. 91-607, tit. I, § 103, 84 Stat. 1763 (1970) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 18 43(c)(9) (1976)). See Pinsky, supra note 4, at 28. The 1963 revision of Reg-
ulation K also removed the distinction between investment and banking EACs. See
note 17 supra.
39. See J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 70; note 30 supra.
40. See F. LEES, supra note 8, at 143-44; Pinsky, supra note 4, at 31.
41. Pinsky, supra note 4, at 29.
42. Lees, supra note 31, at 481-82. In addition, EACs have been established by
their parents to perform clearing house functions in the growing Eurodollar markets.
See McGuire, supra note 8, at 441-42.
43. J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 70, 131; McGuire, supra note 8,
at 441; Pinsky, supra note 4, at 25, 31.
44. The McFadden Act of 1927, 12 U.S.C. § 3 6(c)(2) (1976), permits a national
bank to establish branches at any place within the state where the bank is situated, if
state bank branching is explicitly permitted by the statutes of the state in question.
This provision is also applicable to state banks which are members of the Federal
Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1976). See generally Hackley, supra note 36, at
612-15, 773-74; Lichtenstein, Foreign Participation in United States Banking:
Regulatory Myths and Realities, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 879, 894-902
(1974). The current application of the McFadden Act interstate branching restrictions
is now being questioned. The IBA has directed the federal monetary authorities to
submit a report to Congress on this subject. IBA, supra note 1, § 14. The report, orig-
inally due in September, 1979, is expected to be submitted in April, 1980. See note
79 infra and accompanying text.
45. New York City always has been the center for international finance in the
United States. In 1966, half of the 36 EACs and agreement corporations were located
there. Pinsky, supra note 4, at 31. While New York has maintained its prominence in
international banking with 39 out of 124 EACs and agreement corporations operating
there in 1978, several other cities reported large numbers of these corporations: Los
Angeles (12), Chicago (11), Miami (11), Houston (9), and San Francisco (7). Office of
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Notwithstanding the advantages gained through the use of
EACs as interstate banking offices, the scope of these corporations'
permissible activities within the United States is narrow. 46 One
major restriction in the Edge Act limits EAC activity to purely in-
ternational business transactions, thereby forbidding these corpora-
tions from soliciting domestic deposits and from providing miscella-
neous banking services unless incidental to international trade. 47 In
contrast, foreign banks have long been permitted to operate inter-
state domestic banking offices, which were virtually free from fed-
eral regulation, 48 and subject only to the regulations of the several
states in which they were organized. 49 The provision that incorpo-
ration of each EAC requires a minimum capital investment of two
million dollars50 effectively eliminates all but a few large banks
from establishing sufficient numbers of EACs throughout the coun-
try to compete with foreign-owned institutions. 51
By 1978, Congress recognized that although the Edge Act had
aided international banking in the past, its regulatory framework
had become "antiquated," thus preventing EACs from competing
effectively with foreign banks operating in the United States. 52 It
also was noted that EACs were not providing sufficient funds for
American exports, which was the intent of the Edge Act. 53
Through passage of the IBA, Congress attempted to solve the
problems linked with EAC activity, 54 in addition to providing a
new framework for regulating foreign banking in the United
States. 55
Public Information, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. See also J. BAKER & M.
BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 131-32.
46. Commentators also see these limitations on the powers of EACs as undue
restraints on American banks competing with foreign banking institutions located in
the United States. See Lees, supra note 31, at 481-82; Lichtenstein, supra note 44, at
974-76.
47. 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1976).
48. See Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of
Operations, 55 MONTHLY REV. 140, 154 (1973) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
See generally F. LEES, supra note 8, at 183-84.
49. See F. LEES, supra note 8, at 183-84.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 618 (1976). See note 22 supra.
51. See Wall St. J., June 7, 1979, at 6, cols. 2-3.
52. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
53. Id. at 4-5.
54. IBA, supra note 1, § 3. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-6.
55. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1978
A. Background
Foreign banks had been conducting business in the United
States for almost 100 years56 when Congress finally commissioned a
study of their activities in 1966.5 7 The study concluded that foreign
banks doing business in the United States were operating almost
totally without federal supervision. 58 As a result of the disparate
regulations of the states, foreign banks experienced certain advan-
tages and disadvantages when compared with domestic banks. 59 In
this study, Professor Jack Zwick advocated an active federal role in
foreign bank supervision, to be guided by the principle of "equal
access" for foreign banks in America. 60
In response to the Zwick report, in 1973 the Federal Reserve
Board established a Steering Committee on International Bank-
ing. 6' This committee drafted the various legislative proposals62 for
federal regulation of foreign banks which culminated in H.R.
10899, the International Banking Act of 1978.63
56. See Note, Foreign Banking in the United States, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
595, 597 (1973). For discussions on the extent and scope of foreign bank activity in
the United States and its anomalous regulatory framework prior to the IBA, see gen-
erally F. LEES, supra note 8, at 167-89; Halperin, The Regulation of Foreign Banks
in the United States, 9 INT'L LAW. 661 (1975); Klopstock, supra note 48; Lees, su-
pra note 31; Lichtenstein, supra note 44; Federal Regulation of Foreign Banks, su-
pra note 2, at 145-59.
57. Zwick, supra note 2. See also Lichtenstein, supra note 44, at 882-83. The
study attempted to delineate the characteristic activities of foreign bank offices in the
United States, to assess the influence of these banking offices on domestic banking
operations and on the economy at large, and to appraise the existing arrangements
for examining and supervising these institutions. Zwick, supra note 2, at 1.
58. Zwick, supra note 2, at 26.
59. Id. at 26-29. Advantages included the ability to transfer resources among in-
stitutions located in several states. On the other hand, foreign banks could not obtain
FDIC insurance, and thus were excluded from those states which required deposit-
taking banks to obtain such insurance. Id.
60. Id.
61. 59 FED. RES. BULL. 123 (1973).
62. International Banking Act of 1977, H.R. 7325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
International Banking Act of 1976, H.R. 13876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Foreign
Bank Act of 1975, S. 958, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See Federal Regulation of For-
eign Banks, supra note 2, at 145; Comment, The Regulation of Interstate Bank
Branching Under the International Banking Act of 1978: The Stevenson Compro-
mise, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 284, 286-89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson
Compromise].
63. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
202 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM [Vol. 3:193
Congress thought that federal regulation was necessary as for-
eign banks could no longer "be characterized as specialized institu-
tions engaged principally in foreign trade financing on the periph-
ery of our banking system."" The IBA intended to integrate
foreign banks into the United States dual banking system 65 with
"maximum fairness and minimum disruption."6 6 Under the policy
of national treatment, 67 foreign banks received "the same rights,
duties, and privileges" as domestic banks, and are subjected to
"the same limitations, restrictions, and conditions." 68
B. Provisions of the IBA
It is useful at this point to note briefly the broad coverage of
the IBA. 69 The Act permits foreign banks to obtain federal charters
for their existing state-chartered institutions. 70 They may open new
federally-chartered bank offices in any state which does not specifi-
cally prohibit such offices, 71 and they may acquire existing national
64. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Forty-two foreign banks were operating
banking offices in the United States in 1966. Zwick, supra note 2, at 3. By 1978 that
number had risen to 122. In addition, foreign banks were beginning to influence a
growing proportion of United States credit markets. These considerations prompted
the "need for both Federal monetary policy controls and for a Federal presence in
the regulation and supervision of [foreign bank] activities in the United States."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
65. The dual banking system refers to the uniquely American regulatory frame-
work which requires all banks to comply with varying degrees of both state and fed-
eral regulation and supervision. Until passage of the IBA, foreign banks were only
responsible to state regulators. For an excellent general discussion of the United
States banking system, see Hackley, supra note 36.
66. 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1011, 1012 (1978). "The objective in earlier bills of set-
ting up a comprehensive federal regulatory system over all foreign bank operations
under the direction of the Federal Reserve Board gradually gave way to the tradi-
tional dual banking system concept of shared federal/state regulation." G. Welsh,
The Legislative History of the International Banking Act of 1978, at 17 (March 1,
1979) (outline accompanying remarks delivered at the Practising Law Institute
Course No. 295, The International Banking Act of 1978, in New York City).
67. National treatment is a general policy of the United States whereby foreign
enterprises operating in this country are subject to the same rules and regulations as,
and are treated as competitive equals with, domestically owned enterprises. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 2; Halperin, supra note 56, at 661.
68. Federal Regulation of Foreign Banks, supra note 2, at 159. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
69. For a more thorough analysis of the provisions of this legislation, see gener-
ally Federal Regulation of Foreign Banks, supra note 2, at 159-75; 19 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1011 (1978).
70. IBA, supra note 1, § 4. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-7, 21. See
generally Hablutzel & Lutz, Foreign Banks in the United States After The Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1978: the New Dual System, 96 BANKING L.J. 133 (1979).
71. See Hablutzel & Lutz, supra note 70, at 148-51.
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banks. 72 Generally, the interstate activities of foreign banks are
now limited to those in which national banks may participate, 73
and foreign-owned institutions operating a commercial banking
business here are now subject to the non-banking and anti-tying
provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 74 The IBA
contains generous grandfather provisions in order to mitigate the
impact of these restrictive sections. 75
To implement these provisions Congress established a frame-
work within which federal monetary authorities may regulate, su-
pervise, and examine foreign banking activities in the United
States. 76 Congress also ordered that studies of the treatment of
United States banks abroad77 and of the continued viability of the
McFadden Act restrictions on interstate banking78 be undertaken
by these authorities in conjunction with executive branch officials.
72. IBA, supra note 1, § 2. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, 20.
73. IBA, supra note 1, § 5. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-12, 21-22.
Foreign banks may still establish branch and agency offices in states which permit
their entry, but branches established outside a foreign bank's home state are limited
to the deposit-taking powers of EACs, i.e., they may only accept domestic deposits
incidental to international trade. For a discussion of this final solution to the contro-
versial interstate branching problem, see Stevenson Compromise, supra note 62, at
289-96.
74. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849 (1976). IBA, supra note 1, §§ 5(a), 8. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11, 14-15. For a discussion of the reasons for the Ameri-
can distinction between commercial banking and investment banking, and the appli-
cation of that distinction to foreign banks operating in the United States, see Bowen,
The Securities Activities of Foreign Banks in the United States: A Consideration of
Proposed Changes in Regulation, 10 LAW. AM. 510 (1978).
75. IBA, supra note 1, §§ 5(b), 8 (c). These provisions permit foreign banks to
continue those interstate and non-banking activities which were in operation on July
26, 1978. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.
76. IBA, supra note 1, §§ 6, 7, 11, 13. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at
13-14. The IBA authorizes the Board, FDIC, and the Comptroller of the Currency to
join the states in examining foreign banks operating in the United States. Id. at 13.
77. IBA, supra note 1, § 9. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18. In Sep-
tember, 1979 the Treasury Department submitted its study entitled, Report to Con-
gress on Foreign Government Treatment of U.S. Commercial Banking Organiza-
tions. "The study has the great merit of focusing not merely on what the statutes and
regulations of the various countries say but also on administrative practice and the
practical problems faced by banks in their overseas operations." B. Nichols, Foreign
Regulation of United States Banks Operating Abroad-An Overview, at 1 (Feb.
14, 1980) (outline accompanying remarks delivered at the American Bar Association
National Institute on Legal Aspects of International Banking in New York City).
78. IBA, supra note 1, § 14. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19. See 19 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1011, 1018-19 n.62 (1978); note 44 supra.
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C. Section 3 of the IBA:
Edge Act Amendments
Three significant amendments to the Edge Act were included
in section 3 of the IBA. This section: (1) removed the restriction
that all owners of EACs must be United States citizens; 79 (2) elimi-
nated two statutory limitations on the ability of EACs to compete
effectively with foreign-owned credit institutions;80 and (3) included
a statement of national purpose, which set out the broad objectives
and liberal intent of Congress regarding EAOs. 8l The first of these
revisions was included in each of the earlier versions of the IBA, 82
but the latter two amendments were included only after the Senate
Hearing on the IBA, 83 prompted by several proposals84 made by
Senator Adlai E. Stevenson.8 5
While questioning federal monetary officials86 at the Hearing,
Senator Stevenson pointed out that it would be in the national in-
terest to enlarge "credit facilities throughout the United States, es-
pecially those available for export transactions."8 7 He strongly sug-
79. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(c), (f). See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
80. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(d), (e). See also id. § 3(h). See notes 89-92 infra and
accompanying text.
81. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(b). See notes 93-95 infra and accompanying text.
82. International Banking Act of 1977, H.R. 7325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1977); International Banking Act of 1976, H.R. 13876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3
(1976); Foreign Bank Act of 1975, S. 958, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1975). See Inter-
national Banking Act of 1978: Hearing on H.R. 10899 Before the Subcomm. on Fi-
nancial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978) (statement of G. William Miller, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing].
83. Senate Hearing, supra note 82. Section 3 of H.R. 10899 which passed the
House of Representatives on April 6, 1978 simply permitting foreign ownership of
EACs. Subsequent to the Hearing held on the IBA, see id., the Senate added several
amendments to the legislation, including a greatly revised § 3, which passed the
Senate on August 15, 1978. The House concurred in the Senate's amendments on
August 17, 1978, and President Carter signed the IBA into law on September 17,
1978. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-2.
84. It was at this Hearing that Senator Stevenson proposed his "deft compro-
mise" on the interstate branching issue as well as his proposals concerning the liber-
alization of powers granted to EACs. See Stevenson Compromise, supra note 62, at
286, 294-96.
85. Adlai E. Stevenson III is the Junior Senator, Democrat, from Illinois, and is
Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Finance, Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
86. G. William Miller, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; John G.
Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency; Robert H. Mundheim, General Counsel of
the Treasury; George A. LeMaistre, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. See Senate Hearing, supra note 82, at 56-59, 74-75, 126-27.
87. Id. at 56.
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gested that the powers granted to EACs be liberalized to achieve
that goal. 88
Senator Stevenson observed that two specific requirements in
the Edge Act prevented EACs from reaching their potential as
credit facilities.8 9 One limited the level of liabilities an EAC might
issue to not more than ten times the corporation's capital and sur-
plus. 90 The other imposed a mandatory ten percent reserve re-
quirement on all domestic deposits held by EACs. 9 ' Both of these
requirements were removed to "increase the flexibility of Edge
Corporations in their international financial operations." 92
The third amendment is section 3(b)'s "declaration of congres-
sional policy which is to serve as guidance to future regulatory ac-
tions and interpretations" of the Edge Act by the Board.93 This
policy statement explains that the purpose of the Edge Act is to es-
tablish federally supervised international banking and financial cor-
porations with powers broad enough to 'compete 'effectively with
similar foreign-owned institutions, and to provide at all times a
means for financing international trade, especially United States ex-
88. Id. at 57.
89. Id.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 618 (1976). The reference is to liabilities in the form of deben-
tures, bonds, and promissory notes. Id. This limitation was originally included in the
Edge Act because it was thought that EACs would issue debentures or bonds on the
credit of foreign governments and sell them to the American public. Since that has
not been the case, this limitation was seen as unnecessary and as a hindrance to
EAC competition with foreign-owned credit institutions. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 5. Congress remains concerned about the undercapitalization of banking
institutions in the United States. While removing the statutory limit on an EAC's
debt/equity ratio in § 3(d), Congress added § 3(h) which requires the Board in its an-
nual report to give special attention to the effect of this amendment on the capitaliza-
tion and activities of EACs, commercial banks, and the banking system. Id. at 6.
91. 12 U.S.C. § 615(a) (1976). This minimum was higher than the average per-
centage prescribed for member banks of the Federal Reserve System and served to
place EACs at a cost disadvantage with their competitors. Senate Hearing, supra
note 82, at 58 (letter from G. William Miller). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at
6.
92. Senate Hearing, supra note 82, at 58 (letter from G. William Miller). The
Board had included these liberalizing provisions in its previous drafts of the IBA.
See International Banking Act of 1977, H.R. 7325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1977);
International Banking Act of 1976, H.R. 13876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1976); For-
eign Bank Act of 1975, S. 958, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1975) (no provision
liberalizing reserve requirement). However, the version which first passed the
House in 1978 did not include these provisions. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 95th Cong.,
2d S.ess. 11 (1978); see also note 83 supra.
93. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. A statement of national purpose has
been included in the Board's Regulation K since 1963. See SENATE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 4; e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1979).
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ports. 94 The amendment also encourages the ownership of EACs
by regional and smaller banks. 95
At Senator Stevenson's urging, 96 section 3 required the Fed-
eral Reserve Board to review its rules, regulations, and interpreta-
tions issued pursuant to the Edge Act 97 in furtherance of that sec-
94. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(b) states:
Section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act is amended by adding after the
first paragraph (12 U.S.C. 611), the following new paragraph:
"The Congress hereby declares that it is the purpose of this section to
provide for the establishment of international banking and financial corpora-
tions operating under Federal supervision with powers sufficiently broad to
enable them to compete effectively with similar foreign-owned institutions
in the United States and abroad; to afford to the United States exporter and
importer in particular, and to United States commerce, industry, and agricul-
ture in general, at all times a means of financing international trade, espe-
cially United States exports; to foster the participation by regional and
smaller banks throughout the United States in the provision of international
banking and financing services to all segments of United States agriculture,
commerce, and industry, and, in particular small business and farming con-
cerns; to stimulate competition in the provision ofinternational banking and
financing services throughout the United States; and, in conjunction with
each of the preceding purposes, to facilitate and stimulate the export of
United States goods, wares, merchandise, commodities, and services to
achieve a sound United States international trade position. The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall issue rules and regulations
under this section consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes de-
scribed in the preceding sentence, and, in accordance therewith, shall re-
view and revise any such rules and regulations at least once every five
years, the first such period commencing with the effective date of rules and
regulations issued pursuant to section 3(a) of the International Banking Act
of 1978, in order to ensure that such purposes are being served in light of
prevailing economic conditions and banking practices."
95. Id.
96. See Senate Hearing, supra note 82, at 57.
97. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(a). The revised rules were to be issued in proposed
form in 150 days and in final form in 270 days. Id. The Board complied with those
deadlines. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 36,005 (1979). See generally Part III infra.
In addition, § 3(g) ordered the Board to submit its recommendations concerning
EAC membership in the Federal Reserve System, which it did on June 13, 1979.
The Board would not object if EACs and agreement corporations were permitted to
apply for membership. It recommended, however, that such corporations be
permitted access to the Federal Reserve discount window without requiring that
they become member banks. This would establish equal treatment between EACs
and United States branches and agencies of foreign banks, which have access to the
discount window under the IBA. Letter from G. William Miller to Walter F.
Mondale, accompanying Staff Report on the Advisability of Edge Corporation Mem-
bership in the Federal Reserve System (June 13, 1979). Congress has not yet acted
on the Board's recommendations. Telephone conversation with C. Keefe Hurley,
Senior Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (March 3, 1980).
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tion's purpose. 98 In addition, the Senate Report99 on the IBA
directed the Board to review carefully certain regulations in this
process, including "those pertaining to limitations on aggregate lia-
bilities, use of loan proceeds, employment of funds in the money
market, lending limits, receipt of deposits from domestic concerns,
and limitations on certain guarantees issued." 00
Senator Stevenson's efforts prompted congressional review of
the performance of the Edge Act and EACs for the first time in al-
most sixty years. Congress determined that the purposes of the
Edge Act were not being served by the prevalent regulatory cli-
mate,' 0 1 and attempted to liberalize significantly the powers of
EACs and the regulations concerning them.102 It is clear that Con-
gress directed the Board to revise its regulations substantially in
order to help EACs achieve their intended stature. 10 3 Whether the
98. The purpose of § 3 is:
[Tio eliminate or modify provisions in section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve
Act that (1) discriminate against foreign-owned banking institutions, (2) dis-
advantage or unnecessarily restrict or limit corporations organized under
section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act in competing with foreign-owned
banking institutions in the United States or abroad or (3) impede the attain-
ment of the Congressional purposes set forth in section 25(a) of the Federal
Reserve Act as amended by subsection (b) of this section.
IBA, supra note 1, § 3(a).
99. S. REP. No. 95-1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1421.
100. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. The committee also believed that
"the Board should insure that its regulations in this area are consistently and uni-
formly applied by the various Federal Reserve Banks." Id.
101. The SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4 describes the three principal
congressional purposes of the Edge Act:
First, it was intended that these corporations play a major role in the
financing of U.S. exports .... Second, the new corporations were to be given
the opportunity and the means of competing with similar foreign institu-
tions .... Third, Congress wanted to strengthen Government control and su-
pervision of international banks. ...
While Edge Act corporations have no doubt assisted in the financing of
U.S. exports, the antiquated statutory and regulatory framework under which
they must conduct their operations has hampered their usefulness in this re-
gard and has put them at competitive disadvantages relative to foreign-
owned banking institutions.
Id.
102. See IBA, supra note 1, § 3(a), (b); note 94, 98 supra.
103. See H. Cohen, Recent Developments Regarding Edge Corporations 1
(Feb. 14, 1980) (outline accompanying remarks delivered at the American Bar Associ-
ation National Institute on Legal Aspects of International Banking, in New York
City) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
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Board's revised Regulation K fully implements the IBA's directive,
however, is not as clear.
III. REGULATION K:
INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS
On June 14, 1979 the Board issued its final revision of Regula-
tion K pursuant to section 3 of the IBA.10 4 The Board reviewed not
only the regulations governing EACs but also those governing both
foreign operations of Federal Reserve System member banks and
foreign investment by bank holding companies. 10 5 These regula-
tions were revised and combined into one comprehensive regula-
tion which was first issued in proposed form on February 14,
1979.106 The proposed regulation generated extensive public com-
ment, precipitating its modification in many instances. 10 7 The final
regulation is entitled "International Banking Operations." 0 8
Consideration of the issues raised during this process has con-
tinued a longstanding debate among American bankers, which typ-
ically has pitted the large money-center banks against the small
and regional banks throughout the country. 10 9 The revision re-
104. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1980)).
105. Id. This Note discusses the revised regulation only as applied to EACs.
106. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509 (1979).
107. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979). Ninety-six letters of comment were
received by the Board concerning the proposed regulation. Staff memorandum from
the Legal Division to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May,
1979), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERA-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES an update 401, 403 (Course Handbook 313 (1979))
[hereinafter cited as Summary of Comments].
108. 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1980). The former regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1979), was
entitled "Corporations Engaged in Foreign Banking and Financing Under the Fed-
eral Reserve Act," and has been deleted. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,012 (1979).
Unlike the Edge Act, Regulation K has been revised on other occasions. In 1957,
a more restrictive interpretation of the Act resulted in the formal distinction between
banking and investment EACs. See note 17 supra, The regulation was liberalized by
the Board in 1963, removing that distinction, as well as simplifying approval proce-
dures for the issuance of debentures or bonds, and for investment in foreign corpora-
tions. The 1963 revision also added a liberal statement of national purpose. See note
93 supra and accompanying text. In 1969, Regulation K again was amended,
enlarging the activities to which the Board gives its "general consent." 12 C.F.R. §
211.8 (1979). See generally J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 32-36.
109. See, e.g., [1979] INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, INC. 561 (June 1, 1979); Fed
Action Seen Delayed On Interstate Bank Rules, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1979, at D1,
col. 1; Stevenson Compromise, supra note 62, at 289-93. See also notes 174-75 infra
and accompanying text.
1980] EDGE ACT CORPORATIONS
suited in a compromise of the interests involved, but purportedly
did not result in a compromise of its objectives.110
A. Major Issues
1. Branching
The most controversial action taken by the Board in revising
Regulation K permitted EACs to establish domestic interstate
branches,"' thereby furthering the IBA objective of providing ex-
panded international banking services throughout the United
States. 112 There are several advantages to this new option. It elimi-
nates the requirement of separate capitalization and administration
for each EAC, which was seen as an inefficient use of funds and a
barrier to entering new markets. 113 It also promotes the use of
EACs by both smaller and regional banks, another goal of the
IBA. 1 1 4
The many letters of comment received on the proposed regu-
110. The Board described its actions as furthering certain purposes of the IBA,
"including the stimulation of competition in providing international banking and
financing services throughout the United States." 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005 (1979). Contra
H. Cohen, Recent Developments Regarding Edge Corporations (Feb. 14, 1980) (re-
marks delivered at the American Bar Association National Institute on Legal Aspects
of International Banking, in New York City). "Regulation K did not live up to its
mandate." Id.
111. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4 (c)(1) (1980). While the qualifying customer concept drew
as many comments (72 out of 96) as the branching issue during the comment period,
domestic branching received the most publicity before and after its adoption. See
Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 404, 430; Cohen, supra note 103, at 1;
e.g., Am. Banker, June 11, 1979, at 1, col. 2; [1979] INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, INC.
639 (June 22, 1979); Citibank Plans 10 U.S. Units, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1980, at D1,
col. 6; Banks Urge More Easing On Branches, id., April 26, 1979, at D1, col. 3;
Crossing the Line, Expanding U.S. Banks Hope Law Will Allow National Competi-
tion, Wall St. J., June 21, 1979, at 1, col. 6; Wall St. J., June 7, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
112. See Federal Reserve Board Staff Memorandum, Revision of Regulation K
(May 24, 1979), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES an update 363, 377 (Course Handbook 313
(1979)) [hereinafter cited as Staff Revision].
113. Id. at 373. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979). This enables more banking
organizations to enter the six international financial markets which have already at-
tracted EACs, and places other cities in a better position to attract EACs. Staff Revi-
sion, supra note 112, at 373. See note 45 supra.
114. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979). See also Cohen, supra note 103, at 1.
Those parent banks with more than one EAC would not be prejudiced by this provi-
sion, as EACs could change their organizational form. See 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 510
(1979); Cohen, supra note 103, at 2.
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lation were evenly divided on the issue of branching.1 1 5 Those
which agreed with the Board's proposal contended that domestic
branching would result in more efficient uses of capital, and would
significantly advance the congressional objectives in the IBA by
eliminating unnecessary regulatory restrictions. 116 The critics of the
proposal saw it as a violation of the McFadden Act, and thought it
premature in view of the forthcoming study on interstate branch-
ing. 117 The Board responded by stating that several banks operate
EACs in more than one state, and that EACs are specifically ex-
cluded from federal laws limiting national banks to one state."18
115. Of the 72 comments mentioning this proposal, 35 clearly stated their ap-
proval and 36 disapproved. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 405, 430.
116. The favorable respondents included eight Federal Reserve banks, Senator
Stevenson, and the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA). See Federal
Reserve Board Memorandum, Summary of Reserve Banks Comments on Regulation
K (May, 1979), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES an update 353 (Course Handbook 313
1979)) [hereinafter cited as Reserve Banks Comments]; Letter from Senator
Stevenson to G. William Miller (April 10, 1979), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW IN-
STITUTE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES an
update 395 (Course Handbook 313 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson Com-
ment]; New York Clearing House Association, Memorandum of Comments on Pro-
posed Revisions of Regulation K, at 37 (April 15, 1979) [hereinafter cited as NYCHA
Memorandum]. The members of the NYCHA are the Bank of New York, the Chase
Manhattan Bank, Citibank, the Chemical Bank, the Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany, the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, the Irving Trust Company, the
Bankers Trust Company, the Marine Midland Bank, the United States Trust Com-
pany, the National Bank of North America, and the European-American Bank and
Trust Company. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1979, at D4, col. 6.
Other favorable respondents referred to the authority of foreign banks, granted
in § 5 of the IBA, to branch interstate with the powers of EACs but without their
concomitant restrictions, as justification for this branching provision. Summary of
Comments, supra note 107, at 405. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
117. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 405-06. The American Bankers
Association was especially wary of the joint branching and qualified customer pro-
posals advanced. Letter from the ABA to Theodore E. Allison, Secretary of the Board
3 (May 3, 1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA Comment]. See notes 126-27 infra and ac-
companying text. Several respondents also believed that the proposal was not being
given the proper consideration. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 406. In-
deed, the schedule set by Congress requiring submission of proposals within 150
days and final revisions within 270 days after enactment of the IBA created several
problems. See Cohen, supra note 103, at 11.
118. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979). EACs are exempted from the definition of
"bank" in § 2(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1976). The
McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1976), only applies to national banking associations.
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2. International Customers
The major proposed revision not adopted by the Board was
one which would have created a new class of international cus-
tomer. 119 Under the proposal, EACs would have been permitted
to offer full deposit and other banking services to any customer
which, on an unconsolidated basis, had more than two-thirds of its
sales or purchases in international commerce. 120 This proposal con-
stituted a significant departure from the Board's past practice un-
der which each banking transaction had to be incidental to interna-
tional trade.' 2 ' The Board criticized its current policy and argued
that this proposal would ease the administrative and supervisory
burden placed on EACs and the Federal Reserve System. 122 Had
the Board adopted this provision, EACs would have been better
equipped to compete effectively for the business of firms
specializing in international trade.' 2 3 The Board thought that this
change was consistent with the intent of section 3 of the IBA, as it
would enlarge the ability of EACs to provide international financial
services. 12 4
Many of the favorable respondents agreed that this concept
was consistent with the aims of the IBA, but recommended that
the two-thirds requirement be lowered. 125 Those which disap-
proved believed that this proposal would enable United States par-
ent banks to carry on an interstate domestic banking business in
119. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979).
120. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509 (1979).
"Unconsolidated" in this context means the separately incorporated
businesss entity conducting business with the Edge, excluding any subsid-
iaries and/or parent, would be eligible for qualified customer status. Thus,
an operating division of a company could not qualify. Nor could a company
consolidate with its trade-related subsidiaries in order to qualify.
Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 365 n.1.
121. 12 C.F.R. § 211.7 (1979). See 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509 (1979).
122. Id.
123. See Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 367.
124. Id. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509 (1979).
125. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 407. Senator Stevenson re-
garded this provision in the proposal as "extremely important" in that it would sim-
plify the operations of EACs and facilitate United States export trade. Stevenson
Comment, supra note 116, at 395-96. All twelve Federal Reserve Banks endorsed
this proposal. Reserve Banks Comments, supra note 116, at 353-54. The NYCHA be-
lieved that very few companies would pass the two-thirds test, and recommended a
requirement of 40-50 percent be used. NYCHA Memorandum, supra note 116, at 16.
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violation of the McFadden Act.' 2 6 The American Bankers Associa-
tion and others were particularly hesitant about the adoption of
both the branching proposal and the international customer con-
cept. They feared the "unforeseen impact of the combined propos-
als on the domestic banking structure.' 127
Despite the strong criticism from politically influential re-
spondents, the Federal Reserve Board staff recommended that the
international customer concept be passed, substantially as pro-
posed. '2 8 The Board, however, did not follow its staff's recommen-
dation. The ABA's "unforeseen impact" argument seems to have
carried the most weight during the deliberations prior to issuance
of the final regulation. '2 9 As a result, the Board decided to "defer"
action on this proposal.' 30 While the deferral is "widely perceived
as an indefinite postponement,' 13 1 several recent actions by the
Federal Reserve Board staff show that the proposal has not been
forgotten. 132
126. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 408. Senator William Proxmire,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs strongly
disagreed with the proposal, stating that it was "contrary to the provisions" of the
IBA, which did not grant authority to EACs to conduct a domestic banking business.
Letter from Senator Proximire to G. William Miller (May 8, 1979), reprinted in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES an update 397, 398 (Course Handbook 313 (1979)) [hereinafter cited as
Proxmire Comment].
127. ABA Comment, supra note 117, at 2. The ABA also feared that smaller re-
gional banks would not be able to compete effectively with the EACs of larger
United States and foreign banks if the international customer concept were adopted.
Id. The ABA did note that the adoption of the branching provision without the inter-
national customer concept might be desirable and might make EACs more attractive
and competitive. Id. at 3.
128. Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 366.
129. See [1979] INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, INC. 561 (June 1, 1979). See also
N.Y. Times, May 30, 1979, at D1, col. 1.
130. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979). The Board explained that the information
submitted during the comment period was not sufficient to enable it to assess ade-
quately the likely effects of the proposal. Id.
131. Cohen, supra note 103, at 5.
132. Neal L. Petersen, General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Board, recently
stated that the staff at the Federal Reserve Board was in the process of making field
observations at EACs throughout the country to determine which tests will be used
when the international customer concept is reissued for comment. He suggested sev-
eral different approaches, none of which permitted EACs to offer total deposit serv-
ices to qualifying customers. One approach would authorize total lending services
without deposits. Another would permit some credit balances without full deposit-
taking powers. Petersen believes that some form of the qualifying customer concept
"will be back." Remarks delivered by Mr. Petersen at the American Bar Association
National Institute on Legal Aspects of International Banking, in New York City (Feb.
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3. Capitalization Requirement
The IBA removed the requirement that liabilities issued by
EACs not exceed ten times the corporation's capital and surplus. 133
In its proposed regulation, the Board included a minimum capitali-
zation requirement of six percent of total assets for EACs engaged
in banking. 134 The favorable comments on this requirement con-
tended that it was more flexible than the previous ten-to-one ra-
tio. 135 The vast majority of the respondents, however, objected to
the provision as not being liberal enough since it did not take into
account the risk element of assets held by EACs. 136 They argued
that if a test based on assets were to be used, cash and other
riskless assets should not be included in the asset base. 137
In response to the comments, the Board adopted a more lib-
eral minimum requirement based on seven percent of risk assets,138
reiterating its view that banking EACs should be financially sound
in their own right. 13 9
14,1980). Mr. Petersen added that the Board would probably not reconsider this pro-
posal until after the White House study on the McFadden Act had been submitted to
Congress. Id.
133. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(d). See notes 80, 89-92 supra and accompanying
text.
134. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 514 (1979) (proposed rule, 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a)(3)).
The provision stated:
An Edge Corporation shall at all times be capitalized in an amount that is
adequate in relation to the scope and character of its activities, but in the
case of an Edge Corporation engaged in banking, its capital and surplus
shall not be less than six per cent of total consolidated assets.
Id.
135. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 410. Senator Proxmire sup-
ported the inclusion of a minimum figure and suggested that six percent might be
too liberal. Proxmire Comment, supra note 126, at 397.
136. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 410. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005,
007 (1979).
137. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 410. Other objections to the
proposal stated: first, that it was Congress' intent to liberalize the existing ten-to-one
ratio and the proposed test did not represent a significant relaxation of the capital re-
quirement; and second, that by applying a more restrictive test to Edge Corporations
than is applied to foreign banks in the United States, EACs would be placed at a
competitive disadvantage. Additionally, several respondents believed that the re-
quirement would limit lending and disadvantage both smaller and regional banks
which would otherwise be encouraged to establish EACs. Id. at 410-11. See also Re-
serve Banks Comments, supra note 116, at 355.
138. 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(d) (1980). Risk assets, include all assets on a consolidated
basis other than cash, amounts due from banking institutions in the United States,
United States securities, and federal funds sold. Id. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 007
(1979).
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 007 (1979). The Board thought it necessary to state its
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4. Lending Limits
Regulation K previously limited the liabilities owed by one
person to an EAC to "50 percent of the Corporation's capital and
surplus, or 10 percent thereof if it is engaged in banking."140 The
proposed revision retained these limitations but added the provi-
sion that all loans made to one person by an EAC and its foreign
subsidiaries, when aggregated with those of both its parent Federal
Reserve member bank and the parent's other subsidiaries, may not
exceed that parent member bank's lending limits. 141
Comments on these provisions were evenly divided but those
in opposition raised several interesting points. Retention of the
original limits on EAC lending was seen as an unnecessary restric-
tion which would place those EACs which are in competition with
branches and agencies of foreign banks in the United States at a
disadvantage.' 42 Critics also predicted that the administration of
the aggregation provision would be too time-consuming and
costly. ' 43 One bank saw problems in data collection with regard to
foreign subsidiaries of United States banks and EACs which are
subject to the confidentiality laws of the countries in which they
are located. ' 4 4 In response to the issues raised, the Board removed
the original fifty percent limit on lending to one person by an in-
vestment EAC.14 5 The aggregation concept was retained in the fi-
position on this matter since several respondents suggested that EACs be permitted
to look to their parents' capital and surplus as protection for depositors. Summary of
Comments, supra note 107, at 411.
140. 12 C.F.R. 211.9(b) (1979).
141. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 514 (1979) (proposed rule, 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(a)(2)).
This requirement was designed to prevent these subsidiaries from being
used by a bank to evade its lending limits .... The primary purpose of lend-
ing limits is to provide for some minimal diversification of assets, which in
these cases would be to help reduce the likelihood that a parent bank would
have to "bail out" a subsidiary.
Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 391-92. The amount of the lending limit itself is
determined on the basis of state law (if the Federal Reserve member bank is state
chartered) or the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976) (if the bank is a national
bank). Cohen, supra note 103, at 8.
142. See Reserve Banks Comments, supra note 116, at 360.
143. See Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 424. The New York Fed-
eral Reserve Bank criticized the aggregation proposal as being discriminatory against
Federal Reserve member banks and, as a result, in favor of non-member and foreign
banks which own EACs. Reserve Banks Comments, supra note 116, at 360.
144. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 424. See also Staff Revision, su-
pra note 112, at 390.
145. "With the imposition of a consolidated lending limit, a separate limit on
investment Edge Corporations and foreign subsidiaries appears to be of only mar-
ginal value." Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 391.
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nal regulation, however, as was the separate ten percent of capital
limit for EACs engaged in banking. 146
5. Other Revisions
The powers of EACs have undergone several additional revi-
sions which are worth noting, although they are not as controver-
sial as the previous four proposals. In most cases these revisions
have resulted in substantial liberalization of EAC activities.
a. funding powers
In "[p]erhaps the most meaningful liberalization,' 47 the re-
vised regulation substantially increases EACs' sources of funds. 148
EACs now enjoy freedom to obtain funds in the domestic
interbank market, including federal funds purchases. 149 They may
offer savings deposits to qualified depositors, 150 and they may issue
negotiable certificates of deposit to foreign governments and for-
eign persons in connection with international transactions. 151
146. 12 C.F.R. § 211.6(b) (1980). The aggregation provision was later modified,
however, to indicate clearly that only the parent bank's majority-owned subsidiaries
would be included. See 44 Fed. Reg. 42,152 (1979). See also Cohen, supra note 103,
at 8.
147. Cohen, supra note 103, at 2.
148. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(e) (1980) with 12 C.F.R. § 211.7 (1979).
149. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(e)(4)(i) (1980).
150. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(e)(1), (2) (1980). EACs were previously authorized to ac-
cept demand and time (but not savings) deposits in the United States incidental to
foreign or international business. 12 C.F.R. § 2 11. 7 (c) (1979). It was noted that since
NOW accounts are classified as savings accounts in Federal Reserve Board Regula-
tion D, EACs in New York, New Jersey, and the six New England states can offer
NOW accounts to depositors who qualify under Regulations D and K, namely, for-
eign individuals. Cohen, supra note 103, at 2.
151. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(e)(1), (2) (1980). The proposed regulation restricted EACs
to issuing non-negotiable certificates of deposit. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 512 (1979)
(proposed rule, 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(f)(2), (3)).
The requirement of non-negotiability appears to have resulted from a con-
cern that the purchase by a domestic firm of an outstanding Edge Corpora-
tion CD-where such purchase is not related to an international
transaction-could cause the Edge Corporation to be engaged in domestic
deposit-taking in violation of the Edge Act.
Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 382.
Several respondents objected to this limitation, stating that "the ability of EACs
to attract funds would be hampered if they could not offer their customers the liquid-
ity inherent in negotiable certificates." Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at
415. The NYCHA noted that this provision is more restrictive than the existing regu-
lation which did not limit the forms of the documents evidencing deposits. The As-
sociation pointed out that EACs would be forced to pay a higher interest rate than
their foreign-owned competitors and thus would be disadvantaged, in contradiction
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b. financing goods for export
An EAC's permissible activities have been increased so that
the corporation may finance the production of goods and services
for which export orders have been received or which are identifia-
ble as being directly for export. 152 Previously, EACs were only
permitted to finance shipping and storage of goods incidental to in-
ternational trade. 153 The Board thought that this revision would
not only make EACs more efficient and competitive but also would
promote United States trade in furtherance of the objectives of the
IBA.154 Most of the respondents supported this proposal,' 55 but a
few opponents feared that large banks would gain an unfair advan-
tage as EACs entered what they considered to be a domestic mar-
ket. 156
c. investment powers
Domestically, the investment powers of EACs have been "sig-
nificantly expanded"'157 to add money market instruments to the
list of permitted investments made with funds not currently em-
ployed in international or foreign business.'15 The revised regula-
tion also raised the ceiling for EAC investments in foreign
companies, which do not need prior Board approval. According to
with the objectives of the IBA. NYCHA Memorandum, supra note 116, at 7-8. In re-
sponse to these comments, the Board now permits EACs to issue negotiable certifi-
cates of deposit. 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979). See Staff Revision, supra note 112,
at 382-83.
152. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(e)(4)(v) (1980). The proposed provision would have
permitted the "direct production and preparation of goods readily identifiable as be-
ing for export." 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 512 (1979) (proposed rule, 12 C.F.R. §
211.4(f)(5)(vi)). Reacting to comments received, the Board clarified the provision and
enlarged it to cover exported services, such as architectural or engineering plans. See
Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 379-80; 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 006 (1979). See also
NYCHA Memorandum, supra note 116, at 18-19.
153. 12 C.F.R. § 211.7(d)(1) (1979).
154. See Staff Revision, supra note 112, at 379-80.
155. See Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 409. Senator Stevenson
supported this proposal, explaining that it "should help expand U.S. exports and re-
duce the temptation to shift production overseas." Stevenson Comment, supra note
116, at 395.
156. Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 409.
157. Cohen, supra note 103, at 4.
158. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4(e)(3) (1980). Acceptable money market instruments in-
clude bankers' acceptances, obligations of or fully guaranteed by federal, state, and
local governments and their instrumentalities, repurchase agreements, federal funds
sold, and commercial paper. Id.
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the provision, EACs have "general consent" to invest up to two
million dollars, 159 instead of the previous limit of $500,000,160 in
subsidiaries and joint ventures as long as they are engaged in cer-
tain specified activities.' 6 ' For amounts to be invested abroad in
excess of two million dollars, but not exceeding ten percent of the
EAC's capital and surplus, the Board has enacted a simplified prior
notification procedure. 16 2 In addition, the previous rule that the is-
suance of all long-term debentures, bonds or promissory notes
needed prior Board approval has been eliminated. 163 These revi-
sions reduce the costly and time-consuming procedure of prior ap-
proval which has hindered EACs in the past.' 64
d. engaged in banking
One provision of the revised regulation which is not seen as a
liberalization of EAC powers or activities defines "engaged in bank-
ing."' 65 An EAC which has been determined to be engaged in
banking is subject to many more limitations on its activities than is
an investment EAC.166 Previously, an EAC was engaged in bank-
ing whenever it had "aggregate demand deposits and acceptance li-
abilities exceeding its capital and surplus. '"167 Under the proposed
revision, banking status would be given to an EAC "if it ordinarily
has in the United States total deposit, acceptance and Federal
funds liabilities exceeding its capital and surplus."168 Several re-
spondents thought that this new definition was unnecessarily re-
159. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(1) (1980). The amount invested, however, may not ex-
ceed five percent of the investor's capital and surplus for EACs engaged in banking,
or twenty-five percent of capital or surplus for EACs not engaged in banking. Id.
160. 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(a) (1979).
161. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d) (1980). This provision lists 14 permissible activities
for EACs conducting business abroad.
162. All foreign investments previously made by EACs in excess of the general
consent limitations needed prior Board approval. 12 C.F.R. § 211.8(b) (1979). Now
some of those investments may be made after the EAC has given the Board sixty
days prior notification. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(2) (1980). Any investments which do not
qualify for the general consent or prior notification provisions require the specific
prior consent of the Board. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(c)(3) (1980). See Cohen, supra note 103,
at 7.
163. 12 C.F.R. § 211.4 (1979).
164. See J. BAKER & M. BRADFORD, supra note 8, at 32.
165. See Cohen, supra note 103, at,9-10.
166. Id. at 9. See NYCHA Memorandum, supra note 116, at 32; notes 18-20 su-
pra and accompanying text.
167. 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(d) (1979).
168. 44 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 511 (1979) (proposed rule, 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(b)).
1980]
218 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM [Vol. 3:193
strictive, since the inclusion of time deposits and federal funds
would blur the distinction between banking and investment EACs,
and limit the latter's incidental use of time deposits and federal
funds.' 69
Noting the comments received, the Board slightly amended its
definition for the final regulation, but did so "without any fan-
fare.' 170 Now, an EAC is engaged in banking if "it is ordinarily en-
gaged in the business of accepting deposits in the United States
from nonaffiliated persons.' 17 1 While earlier definitions focused on
the total value of deposits, the present definition seems to rely on
the frequency of any level of deposit-taking by the EACs. 172 Thus,
this definition acts as a greater restriction on EAC operations, par-
ticularly on those of investment EACs which have always carried
on some small portion of a deposit-taking business. 173
In sum, the United States banking community viewed Regula-
tion K as a liberal revision of the rules pertaining to EACs. The
banks recognized that complex issues were involved and that in
many respects the proposals were constructive and followed the
objectives of the IBA. 174 One faction, which included Senator
Stevenson and the New York Clearing House Association, believed
that the Board did not go far enough in liberalizing the regulations
to achieve congressional objectives. On the other hand, the Ameri-
can Bankers Association and Senator Proxmire, traditionally sup-
porters of small and regional banks throughout the United States,
feared that the Board went too far in its recommendations, and the
political pressure from this faction was sufficient to force deferral of
the international customer concept. 175
169. See Summary of Comments, supra note 107, at 411-12. The NYCHA con-
sidered the proposed definition as inconsistent with congressional objectives, as it
would impose additional restrictions on what were previously investment EACs.
NYCHA Memorandum, supra note 116, at 32-33.
170. H. Cohen, Recent Developments Regarding Edge Corporations (Feb. 14,
1980) (remarks delivered at the American Bar Association National Institute on Legal
Aspects of International Banking in New York City).
171. 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(d) (1980).
172. "Ordinarily" was not defined in the regulation, nor was it mentioned in
the unpublished interpretations issued by the Board to the Federal Reserve Banks.
See Cohen, supra note 103, at 13-15.
173. Id. at 10, 11.
174. See, e.g., ABA Comment, supra note 117, at 1, 4.
175. See, e.g., [1979] INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, INC. 561 (June 1, 1979); N.Y.
Times, June 7, 1979, at DI, col. 6.
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B. Effects and Implications of Regulation K
This revision of Regulation K has already resulted in an in-
crease in the number of applications received by the Board from
American and foreign banks, both for original incorporation and for
the establishment of EAC branches. 176 The renewed interest in
EACs will continue as both United States and foreign banks
reevaluate their plans for entry into the interstate international
banking market. Foreign banks in particular will find EACs an at-
tractive vehicle for entry into United States markets, since foreign
banks which establish EACs here are not restricted as to their non-
banking activities, while foreign parent banks which establish
branches or agencies in the United States are restricted as to such
non-banking activities. 177
The Regulation has created one problem regarding state taxa-
tion of EACs. A strict reading of one provision of the Edge Act,
permitting states to tax the operations of EACs which have home
offices situated in that state, 178 now appears generally to prohibit
states from taxing the operations of EAC branches which have par-
ents located in another state. 179 Because the removal of this taxing
power clearly was not intended by the Board, remedial legislation
is believed to be forthcoming. 180 Other minor areas of confusion
176. Remarks delivered by C. Keefe Hurley, Senior Counsel, Federal Reserve
Board, at the American Bar Association National Institute on Legal Aspects of Inter-
national Banking, in New York City (Feb. 14, 1980). See, e.g., Citibank Plans 10 U.S.
Units, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1980, at D1, col. 6.
177. See note 74 supra and accompanying text; D. Dean, Effect of the Act on
State Regulation 282. (June 21, 1979) (outline accompanying remarks reprinted in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES an update (Course Handbook 313 (1979)). Ownership of EACs does not by
itself make a foreign bank a Bank Holding Company under § 8 of the IBA, therefore
it is possible for a foreign bank to operate a securities affiliate in the United States in
addition to conducting EAC operations. Id. In fact, the Board has permitted at least
one foreign bank to establish an EAC notwithstanding its ownership of a domestic
securities affiliate. Cohen, supra note 103, at 10.
178. 12 U.S.C. § 627 (1976). This provision was passed at a time when states
were prohibited from taxing national banks which existed outside of their home
state. Although taxation of national banks has been liberalized, this provision of the
Edge Act has not been amended, resulting in a restrictive interpretation of this pro-
vision, as applied to the states. O'Brien, State and Local Taxation of Branches of
Edge Act Corporations-Opportunities and Limitations, 96 BANKING L.J. 893,
895-96 (1979).
179. "The only states that may tax, based upon the presence of a branch of an
Edge Act corporation within the state, are those states which impose a shares
tax-not an income or franchise tax." O'Brien, supra note 178, at 893.
180. Id. at 897.
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have also surfaced, requiring the Board to issue unpublished inter-
pretations of the Regulation to the Federal Reserve Banks.181
CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve Board's issuance of revised Regulation K
has substantially advanced the objectives of the IBA. Although the
practices of many large United States banks may not be greatly af-
fected by the new Regulation, the overall use of EACs as a me-
dium for international trade financing by banks throughout the
United States will be enhanced. The Board, however, should con-
tinue its efforts to liberalize EAC powers by reintroducing the in-
ternational customer concept, and by revising its definition of "en-
gaged in banking" to reflect the realities of incidental deposit
taking by investment EACs. Through implementing these changes,
and through completing the required review of Regulation K every
five years, 182 the Board will help the United States move closer to
reaching Senator Edge's goal of providing an efficient, private
means to promote our export trade.18 3
James T. Tynion III
181. See Cohen, supra note 103, at 13-15.
182. IBA, supra note 1, § 3(b) states:
... The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall issue
rules and regulations under this section consistent with and in furtherance
of the purposes described in the preceding sentence [see note 96 supra],
and, in accordance therewith, shall review and revise any such rules and
regulations at least once every five years, the first such period commencing
with the effective date of rules and regulations issued pursuant to section
3(a) of the International Banking Act of 1978, in order to ensure that such
purposes are being served in light of prevailing economic conditions and
banking practices.
183. United States exports would also be aided by passage of the Export Trad-
ing Company Act of 1980, S. 2379, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONGC. REC. S2148
(1980), which was introduced on March 4, 1980 by Senator Stevenson. This bill
would facilitate the formation and operation of companies providing American pro-
ducers and suppliers with export trade services, such as: freight forwarding, ship-
ping, marketing, advertising, insurance, and legal advice. The Act would also enlarge
the powers of EACs to permit them to invest in these domestic export trading
companies. Currently, EACs may invest in domestic corporations only if the business
conducted by those corporations in the United States is incidental to their interna-
tional or foreign business, 12 U.S.C. § 615(c) (1976).
